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THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF CHILDHOOD
Elizabeth S. Scott*
American law makers have had relatively clear images of childhood and adulthood, images
that fit with our conventional notions. Children are innocent beings, who are dependent,
vulnerable, and incapable of making competent decisions. Several aspects of the legal regulation
of childhood are based on this account. Children are assumed not to be accountable for their
choices or for their behavior, an assumption that is reflected in legal policy toward their criminal
conduct. They are also assumed to be unable to exercise the rights and privileges that adults
enjoy, and thus are not permitted to vote, drive, or make their own medical decisions. Finally,
children are assumed to need care, support and education in order to develop into healthy
productive adults. The obligation to provide the services critical to children’s welfare rests first
with parents and ultimately with the state. When children cross the line to legal adulthood, they
are assumed to be autonomous persons who are responsible for their conduct, entitled as citizens
to legal rights and privileges, and no longer entitled to support or special protections.
This picture is deceptively simple, of course. In fact, the legal regulation of children is
extremely complex. Much of the complexity can be traced ultimately to a single source - -defining
the boundary between childhood and adulthood. Thus, the question, “What is a child?” is readily
answered by policy makers, but the answer to the question, “When does childhood end?” is
different in different policy contexts. This variation makes it very difficult to discern a coherent
image of legal childhood. Youths who are in elementary school may be deemed adults for
purposes of assigning criminal responsibility and punishment, while seniors in high school cannot
vote and college students are legally prohibited from drinking.1
The picture is complicated further by the fact that policy makers have no clear image of
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In 27 states, a 10 year old charged with murder could be tried as an adult. See Dept. of Justice, Juvenile
Offenders and Victims: A National Report 86-7 (1995). For a discussion of legislative reform lowering the age at
which minors can be tried as adults, see t.a.n. 105 to 108 infra. The voting age and the passage of the 26th
Amendment are discussed t.a.n. 42 to 45 infra. See 23 U.S.C.A. § 158 (2000)(beginning September 30, 1985,
federal funds for highway construction will be withheld from any state that has a drinking age of less than 21 years
of age.
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adolescence. Generally, they ignore this transitional developmental stage, classifying adolescents
legally either as children or as adults, depending on the issue at hand. For many purposes,
adolescents are described in legal rhetoric as though they were indistinguishable from young
children, and are subject to paternalistic policies based on assumptions of dependence,
vulnerability and incompetence.2 For other purposes, teenagers are treated as fully mature adults,
who are competent to make decisions, accountable for their choices and entitled to no special
accommodation.
For the most part, this binary classification scheme works well. A bright line rule that
designates a particular age as the boundary between childhood and adulthood for multiple
purposes (the “age of majority”), regardless of actual maturity, has the advantage of providing a
clear signal of the attainment of adult legal status. It is also administratively efficient and
promotes parental responsibility. Moreover, by shifting the boundary and extending adult rights
and duties at different points for different purposes, lawmakers accomplish the transition from
childhood to adulthood gradually, without creating an intermediate category for adolescence.
Adolescents may benefit if they are allowed to make some adult decisions or perform some adult
functions, but not others. Thus, for example, the gap between the minimum legal threshold for
driving and drinking offers young persons independence and mobility, while protecting them (and
us) from the costs of immature youthful judgment. Indeed, the experience with the burdensome
administrative and social costs of an intermediate category in the context of abortion regulation
reinforces the conclusion that the transition to adulthood generally is regulated more efficiently
through binary legislative categories - - even if the crude classification of adolescents sometimes
distorts developmental reality.3
In some contexts, however, categorical assumptions that ignore the transitional stage of
adolescence can lead to harmful outcomes. In particular, juvenile justice policy offers ample
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Good examples of this rhetoric include judicial language justifying restrictions on adolescent abortion
(See tan 27 & 28 infra), and political arguments by Progressive reformers advocating for the establishment of a
juvenile court. See t.a.n. 90 to 95 infra.
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The judicial by-pass hearing (to provide a forum for a pregnant teenager to demonstrate that she should
be allowed to make the abortion decision without involving her parents) is a key element of abortion regulation.
For a discussion of the legal and constitutional framework that has resulted from efforts to accommodate
competing interests, see t.a.n. 58 to 80 infra.
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evidence of the costs of using crude categories to define legal childhood and adulthood.4 In this
setting, the boundary of childhood has shifted dramatically over the course of the 20th century.
Legal rhetoric seems to suggest that, since the establishment of the juvenile court in 1899, young
offenders have been transformed from innocent children to hardened adult criminals. On my view,
however, both the romanticized vision of youth offered by the early Progressive reformers and the
harsh account of modern conservatives are distortions - - and both have been the basis of
unsatisfactory policies. The architects of the traditional juvenile court pretended that youth
welfare was the only goal of juvenile justice policy. This fiction ignored the government’s interest
in punishment and public protection, and ultimately it did not serve the interests of young
offenders or that of society. Modern reformers focus only on punishment and public protection,
and ignore any differences between juvenile offenders and adults. A policy that ignores youth
welfare is not only anomalous, but is unlikely to achieve the utilitarian goal of reducing the social
costs of youth crime. In this context, effective legal regulation requires the (conventional)
accommodation of youth welfare and social utility goals, and also (and this is less typical) a
realistic account of adolescence.
The essay proceeds as follows: In Part I, I present the legal account of childhood,
sketching the traits that are assumed to distinguish children from adults, and the policies that are
based on these assumptions. Contrasting with the straightforward account of childhood is the
absence of any clear vision of adolescence. I turn, in Part II, to the issue of how the state draws
the legal boundary between childhood and adulthood. My analysis of the presumptive age of
majority includes an examination of the passage of the 26th Amendment, which offers interesting
lessons on how we fix this boundary. I then examine medical decisionmaking and abortion rights,
contexts that clarify the benefits of a binary classification scheme. Abortion regulation particularly
is instructive of the costs of an intermediate category that uses a case-by-case approach. In Part
III, I examine juvenile justice policy, a context in which the general efficiency of binary
classification does not hold. Strikingly different (and largely fictional) accounts of young
offenders have been deployed in service of the policy agendas of Progressives and of modern
conservatives. I conclude that a justice policy that treats adolescence as a distinct
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legal category not only will promote youth welfare, but will also advance utilitarian objectives of
reducing the costs of youth crime.

I. LEGAL IMAGES OF CHILDHOOD AND ADOLESCENCE
A. Assumptions about Childhood in Legal Policy
Paternalistic legal regulation of children is based on a conventional understanding of
childhood, an understanding that conforms quite well to the developmental account of human
capacities in the early stages of life. Immature youths are assumed to be unable to look out for
themselves, and thus are in need of adult supervision and guidance. Several interrelated
dimensions of immaturity are important in shaping legal policies that treat children differently
from adults. First, children are dependent on others - - initially, for survival and, as they grow, for
the care that will enable them to mature to adulthood. This dependency means that others provide
for their basic needs - - for food, shelter, health care, affection, and education - -, so that they may
become healthy, productive members of society. Children also lack the capacity to make sound
decisions. Because of their immature cognitive development, children are unable to employ
reasoning and understanding sufficiently to make choices on the basis of a rational decisionmaking
process. Children’s decisionmaking also reflects immature judgment, which may lead them to
make choices that are harmful to their interests and the interests of others.5 This decisionmaking
immaturity warrants giving others authority over important decisions affecting children’s lives.
Finally, children are assumed to be malleable and thus vulnerable to both influence and harm from
others.6
This account of childhood leads quite naturally to the conclusion that children must be
subject to adult authority, and that the deeply ingrained political values of autonomy,
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See gen. Elizabeth Scott, Judgment and Reasoning in Adolescent Decisionmaking, 37 Villanova L. Rev.
1607 (1992); FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, CHANGING LEGAL WORLD OF ADOLESCENCE 36 (1982).
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The presumed malleability of children supported the argument that young offenders would respond
positively to rehabilitation, a claim that was central to the rehahabilitative model of juvenile justice. See t.a.n 99
infra.
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responsibility and liberty simply do not apply to them.7 Under American law, primary
responsibility for the welfare of children and authority over their lives is given to their parents.
Justice Burger captured the conventional rationale for this assignment in Parham v. J.R., a United
States Supreme Court opinion dealing with parental authority to admit their children to state
psychiatric hospitals.
“The law’s concept of a family rests on a presumption that parents possess what children
lack in maturity, experience and capacity for judgment required to make life’s difficult
decisions. More importantly, historically it has recognized that natural bonds of affection
lead parents to act in the best interests of their children.”8
Parents are charged with their children’s basic care and with the duty to protect them
from harm. They also are authorized to make decisions on their behalf about matters ranging from
nutrition, medical treatment, and residence to (in theory) the choice of friends and reading
material. Parental responsibility and authority go hand in hand. In some sense it is fair to view
parental “rights” as legal compensation for the burden of responsibility that the law imposes on
parents.9
Of course, parents do not have total authority over their children’s lives. Society has an
important stake in the healthy development of children, and it will bear the burden of parental
failure to fulfill their obligations. Moreover, under its historic parens patriae authority, the
government has the responsibility to look out for the welfare of minors and other helpless
members of society.10 Thus, parental authority is subject to government supervision; if parents fail
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Even John Stuart Mill assumed that liberal principles do not apply to children: “It is, perhaps, hardly
necessary to say that this doctrine [liberty] is meant to apply only to human beings in the majority of their faculties.
We are not speaking of children, or of young persons below the age which the law may fix as that of manhood or
womanhood.” ON LIBERTY 15 (Oxford University Press 1974) (1859).
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442 U.S. 584 at 602 (1979)
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Robert Scott and I have developed this argument elsewhere. Elizabeth Scott & Robert Scott, Parents as
Fiduciaries, Va. L.Rev. (1995).
10

The government’s parens patriae authority arose out of the king’s duty to provide for persons under
legal disability, such as infants and the insane. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (1993). Originally developed by
chancery courts as an equitable concept applied to property rights, the parens patriae doctrine formally entered
American jurisprudence to justify commitment of juveniles to refuges in the leading case of Ex Parte Crouse (4
Whart. 9 [Pa. 1838]). See generally Douglas R. Rendleman, Parens Patriae: From Chancery to the Juvenile
Court, 23 S.C. L. REV. 205 (1971).
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to provide adequate care, the state will intervene to protect children’s welfare. The state also
preempts parental authority more categorically on some issues. For example, under child labor
and school attendance laws, parents can not decide that their children should work instead of
attending school.11 Traditionally policy debates in this area have focused on the allocation of
authority between parents and the state.12
It may be useful to sketch more precisely how assumptions about children’s dependency,
incompetence, and vulnerability are expressed in legal regulation. First, children’s rights and
privileges are far more restricted than are those accorded adults. Because they are assumed to
lack the capacity for reasoning, understanding and mature judgment, children can not vote, make
most medical decisions, drink alcohol, or drive motor vehicles. Their First Amendment right of
free speech is more limited than is that of adults, in part, because it is assumed that they may be
vulnerable to harmful effects. Thus, for example, the Supreme Court has held that the state can
restrict children’s access to obscene material that would be protected speech for adults, and that
public school officials can censor material in school newspapers.13 Through curfew ordinances,
the government can limit the freedom of minors to move about in society through restrictions that
clearly would be unconstitutional for adults.14 The premise of these laws is that children roaming
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The Supreme Court enunciated this constraint on parental rights in Prince v. Massachusetts, in
upholding the Massachusetts child labor law, against a challenge that it infringed on parental authority. 321 U.S.
158 (1944).
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This line drawing has been the subject of much constitutional litigation. See, e.g., Pierce v. Society of
Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (holding that parents have the right to send their children to private school); Meyer v.
Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 401 (1923) (“The legislature has attempted materially to interfere with...the power of
parents to control the education of their own.”); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944) (holding that the
state may limit parental freedom and authority when necessary to protect the welfare of children); Wisconsin v.
Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 232 (1972) (holding that Amish parents can not be penalized for not complying with
compulsory school attendance statute). A contemporary debate focuses on parental objections to public school
curriculum. See e.g. Mozert v. Hawkins County Board of Education, 827 F.2d 1058 (6th Cir. 1987), cert. denied,
484 U.S. 1066 (1988)(finding required use of textbook series no unconstitutional burden under Free Exercise
Clause).
13

Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968) (upholding New York statute restricting sale of “obscene
material” to minors); Hazelwood School Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988). Ginsberg v. New York;
Hazelwood School Dist. v. Kuhlmeier (upholding prior restraint of school newspaper.)
14

Courts recognize that curfew ordinances would violate the rights of adults to move about in public, but
uphold carefully tailored ordinances that are directed at juveniles. Qutb v. Strauss, 11 F.3d 488 (5th Cir. 1993);
Schleifer v. City of Charlottesville, 963 F. Supp. 534 (W.D. Va. 1997), aff’d 159 F.3d 843 (4th Cir. 1998).
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the streets at night may get in trouble (through the exercise of immature judgment), and that they
will be vulnerable to harmful influences.
Second, children also are not held to an adult standard of legal accountability for their
choices and behavior, because of assumptions about their cognitive and social immaturity, and
their vulnerability to undue influence. Thus, under the infancy doctrine in contract law, minors are
free to disaffirm most contracts.15 Many of the cases involve motor vehicles, which courts seem
to believe that youths might be tempted to purchase without considering the obligation that they
are undertaking.16 As one court put it, a minor “should be protected from his own bad judgments
as well as from adults who would take advantage of him.”17
In the same category but of broader importance is the traditional legal response to criminal
conduct by juveniles. The founders of the Juvenile Court at the turn of the last century advocated
against assigning criminal responsibility to the offenses of children. Children were not criminally
responsible, on their view, because they lacked the capacity for reasoning, moral understanding
and judgment on which attributions of blameworthiness must rest. The integrity of the criminal
law would be undermined if incompetent children were subject to criminal punishment.18 As Ben
Lindsay, an early judge of the Denver Juvenile Court, put it, “Our laws against crimes are as
inapplicable to children as they would be to idiots”19 Even contemporary advocates for criminal
punishment implicitly acknowledge that children, because of their immaturity, are less
blameworthy than adults. In arguing that young offenders be held to adult standards of criminal
15

Minors are liable only on contracts for necessaries. Under the traditional rule, minors can disaffirm
other contracts, at their option, returning consideration in possession, but with no liability for use or damage.
Under the modern (minority) rule, minors can disaffirm, but must compensate the contracting party for use or
damage, unless overreaching by the other party is involved. See discussion in S. DAVIS, E. SCOTT, W.
WADLINGTON, & C. WHITEBREAD, CHILDREN IN THE LEGAL SYSTEM 101-6 (1997).
16

See e.g., Bobby Floars Toyota, Inc. v. Smith, 296 S.E.2d 320 (NC App. 1980); Haydocy Pontiac Inc. v.
Lee, 250 N.E.2d 898 (Ohio Ct. App. 1969); Dodson v. Schrader, 824 S.W.2d 545 (Tenn. 1992); Halbman v.
Lemke, 298 N.W. 2d 562 (Wisc. 1980). See ROBERT E. SCOTT AND DOUGLAS L. LESLIE, CONTRACT LAW AND
THEORY 366-379 (2d ed. 1993).
17

Kiefer v Fred Howe Motors, 158 N.W.2d 288 (Wisc. 1968).
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Proportionality requires that punishment be proportionate to the harm caused and the blameworthiness
of the offender. Children are assumed not to be blameworthy moral agents. See Peter Arenella, Convicting the
Morally Blameless, 39 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 1511, 1521 (1992).
19

See BEN B. LINDSEY AND HARVEY J. O’ HIGGINS, THE BEAST (1909).
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responsibility, they make the problem disappear at least at a rhetorical level by simply describing
young offenders as adults and not children.20
A third category of legal policies directed at children includes explicit and implicit legal
protections and entitlements that respond to children’s dependency. The law requires parents and
the state to provide children with support, care and education - - services that they need for their
survival and development, and that they are unable to provide for themselves. Parental child
support obligations, public welfare support, Medicaid, and Head Start programs provide a safety
net that is designed to assure that children’s basic needs are met. Public school education
(including educational services to disabled children)21 is an entitlement in all states, providing
all children with the opportunity to develop the capacities needed to become productive citizens.
Moreover, because children are vulnerable and unable to assert their own interests, the state
enforces parents’ duty to provide adequate care through elaborate civil and criminal child abuse
and neglect regulation. This system not only provides incentives for parents to identify their own
interests with those of their children, but also offers the necessary substitute care, when parents
fail egregiously in their responsibilities.22
Taken together, this complex network of legal regulation suggests that policy makers view
children as a very special class of citizens, a group whose unique traits and circumstances warrant
a different regulatory scheme from that which applies to the rest of us. In general these policies of
restricted rights and privileges, limited responsibility, and special protections are grounded firmly
in a consistent account of what it means to be a child.

20

See, e.g. Alfred S. Regnery, Getting Away with Murder: Why the Juvenile Justice System Needs an
Overhaul, 34 POL’Y REV. 65, 68 (1985) (“There is no reason that society should be more lenient with a 16-year-old
offender than a 30-year-old offender”); Virginia Ellis, Lungren to Seek Lower Age for Trial as Adult, L.A. TIMES,
Jan. 15, 1993 at A3 (quoting Cal. Att’y Gen. Dan Lungren: “If you commit an adult crime, you’d better be
prepared to do adult time”); Jon R. Sorenson, Pataki Plan on Juvenile Offenders Includes Longer Sentences in
Adult Jails, BUFFALO NEWS, Dec. 10, 1995 at 16A (quoting N.Y. Governor Pataki: “Adult crime should mean
adult time”).
21

See Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, P.L. 94-142, 20 USC 1401 et. seq. (1975)
Under this statute, Congress requires all states to provide educational services to disabled children.
22

See discussion in Scott and. Scott, Parents as Fiduciaries, supra note 9.
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B. Adolescence in Legal Rhetoric.
No one thinks that adolescents are similar to toddlers in their reasoning and judgment,
dependency or vulnerability. The empirical assumptions about developmental immaturity that
shape the legal images of childhood do not fit comfortably with conventional notions of
adolescence. As compared with younger children, adolescents are close to adulthood. They are
physically mature, and most have the cognitive capacities for reasoning and understanding
necessary for making rational decisions.23 Yet, adolescents are not fully formed persons in many
regards; they continue to be dependent on their parents and on society, and their inexperience and
immature judgment may lead them to make poor choices which threaten harm to themselves or
others.24 Conventional wisdom about adolescence generally tracks scientific knowledge about
human development - - individuals in this group are proceeding through a developmental stage
between childhood and adulthood--they are neither children or adults.25
Although law makers have occasionally recognized the distinctive character of
adolescence,26 more typically this transitional stage is invisible, and adolescents are incorporated

23

Piaget concluded that the highest stage of cognitive development (the capacity to engage in formal
operational thinking) is attained by mid-adolescence. At this point, youths are capable of hypothetical reasoning
(comparing the consequences of two alternatives). See generally, BARBEL INHELDER & JEAN PIAGET, THE
GROWTH OF LOGICAL THINKING FROM CHILDHOOD TO ADOLESCENCE (1958); JOHN FLAVELL, ET.AL., COGNITIVE
DEVELOPMENT (3d ed. 1993) (describing Piaget’s contributions to cognitive theory). Although most modern
cognitive psychologists do not believe that cognitive development is stagelike, but rather proceeds at different rates
in different domains, by age 14 or 15, adolescents come close to cognitive maturity in many realms. ROBERT
SIEGLER, CHILDREN’S THINKING (1991); William Gardner, David Scherer, Maya Tester, Asserting Scientific
Authority: Cognitive Development and Adolescent Legal Rights, 44 Amer Psychologist 895 (1989).
24

Elizabeth S. Scott, N. Dickon Reppucci and Jennifer L. Woolard, Evaluating Adolescent DecisionMaking in Legal Contexts, 19 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 221 (1995). See also Laurence Steinberg & Elizabeth
Cauffman, Maturity of Judgement in Adolescence: Psychosocial Factors in Adolescent Decisionmaking, 20 L. &
Human Behavior 249 (1996),
25

See generally JOHN DACEY AND MAUREEN KENNY, ADOLESCENT DEVELOPMENT (2d ed. 1997);
DOUGLAS C. KIMMEL, ADOLESCENCE: A DEVELOPMENTAL TRANSITION (2d ed. 1995); DAVID SCHAFFER,
DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY: CHILDHOOD AND ADOLESCENCE (2d ed. 1989); NORMAN SPRINTHALL,
ADOLESCENT PSYCHOLOGY: A DEVELOPMENTAL VIEW (3d ed. 1995). Laurence Steinberg and Elizabeth
Cauffman, The Elephant in the Courtroom: A Developmental Perspective on the Adjudication of Youthful
Offenders, 6 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 389 (1999).
26

An example is creative regulation of motor vehicle licensing. Youths of 16 can get drivers licenses in
most states, but in some states, the privilege is subject to some restrictions until adulthood. For example in
California, Maryland, and Nebraska, minors can not drive after midnight unless supervised by certain adults. Cal.
Veh. Code §12814.6 (2000); Md. Transportation Code §16-113 (1999); R.R.S. Neb. §60-4,120.01 (2000). This
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into the binary legal categories of childhood or adulthood. For many purposes-- voting, military
service, domicile, contracting, and entitlement to support -- adolescents are legal children until a
bright line age of majority transforms them into adults. For other purposes, adult status is
attained either before the age of majority (driving) - - or after (drinking).
When extending legal rights or responsibilities to minors is the subject of policy debate,
adolescents are usually described as either children or as mature adults--depending upon the
desired classification. Abortion jurisprudence provides a good example of the elusiveness of
adolescence in legal rhetoric. When the Supreme Court recognizes parental authority and other
constraints on the rights of pregnant minors, teens are described as children. In Bellotti v. Baird
for example, Justice Powell points to the vulnerability of children, their lack of experience,
perspective and judgment, and the guiding role of parents in the upbringing of their children as the
basis for limiting adolescent abortion rights.27 In contrast, advocates who favor conferring adult
abortion rights on teens present quite a different image of pregnant adolescents. In H.L. v.
Matheson, for example, Justice Marshall argued (in dissent) that Utah’s statutory restrictions
amounted to a state-created obstacle to “the exercise of the minor woman’s free choice.”28
In general, both advocates and law makers ignore the developmental realities of

driving curfew is even earlier in other states. See e.g., La. R.S. 32:416.1 (2000) (11 p.m.); N.C. Gen. Stat. §20-11
(1999) (9 p.m.); S.C. Code Ann. §56-1-175 (1999) (daylight hours only); S.D. Codified Laws §32-12-12 (2000)(8
p.m.). This trend, adopted or being adopted in many states, is called “graduated licensing” and involves a threestep process: a minor must first get a restricted learner’s permit and then a restricted provisional license before
receiving a “full” unrestricted license as an adult. See e.g., Iowa Code §321.180B (1999), 1999 D.C. Act 190
(graduated licensing to take effect beginning 9/1/2000). The State of New York is unusual in that it varies its
restrictions depending on the region of the state. See N.Y CLS Veh. & Tr. §501(3)(c) (minors are not permitted to
drive within the limits of New York City). Thus, in these states, adolescents are accorded an adult privilege, but
with restrictions that acknowledge that they are not ready to assume full adult responsibilities.
Another context in which adolescents are distinguished from younger children is in the adjudication of
child custody disputes. In most states, the preferences of teens regarding custody is given greater weight than is
that of younger children. See Elizabeth Scott, N.D. Reppucci, & Mark Aber, Children’s Preference in Adjudicated
Custody Decisions, 22 Ga. L. Rev. 1035 (1988).
27

443 U.S. 622 (1979). Despite this rhetoric however, Justice Powell acknowledges that many
adolescents may be sufficiently mature to make their own abortion decisions. Bellotti requires that a minor be
given the opportunity (through a hearing) to demonstrate her maturity and ability to make an autonomous decision.
See t.a.n. 72 to 73 infra.
28

H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398, 441 (1981) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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adolescence, and endorse fictional accounts in which adolescents are either immature children
(and thus dependant, incompetent, and vulnerable), or mature adults (and thus self-sufficient,
competent and responsible). This does not mean, however, that such binary classification is
generally bad policy, or that it disserves the interests of adolescents. To the contrary, this
approach works well for the most part. To a considerable extent, classification of adolescents as
children (for most purposes) or adults (for some purposes) constitutes a coherent and socially
beneficial scheme .

II. DRAWING THE LINE BETWEEN LEGAL CHILDHOOD AND ADULTHOOD
As I have suggested, children cross over the line to legal adulthood at different ages for
different purposes. The baseline, of course, is the age of majority, the age at which presumptive
adult legal status is attained. However, a complex regime of age grading defines childhood as a
category with multiple boundaries. Youths charged with murder can be tried as adults at age 10
or younger in some states,29 and high school students can obtain contraceptives without parental
permission.30 On the other hand, non-custodial parents may be obliged to contribute to their
children’s college expenses and young adults are can not drink or run for Congress.31 What
explains this variation?
The logic of the multiple boundaries of childhood is far from obvious. Most
straightforwardly, age grading can be explained as a functions of different maturity requirements
in different legal domains. Both youths and society benefit if adult legal status is conferred when
(and only when) young citizens are capable of fulfilling the law’s expectations. Thus, no one
would challenge that the maturity demanded to fulfill the role of president (currently limited to

29

See 33 NEV. REV. STAT. § 62.040 (2000) (juvenile court does not have jurisdiction of persons accused
of murder, without regards to age); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, § 5506 (2000) (children age 10 and up can be
transferred to adult court if charged with certain enumerated offenses including, but not limited to, murder,
aggravated assault, and kidnaping); WIS. STAT. § 938.183 (1999) (adult court has original jurisdiction over
juveniles age 10 and over who are alleged to have attempted or committed murder).
30

See t.a.n. 56 to 57 infra.

31

Under Article I Section. 2 of the U.S. Constitution, the minimum age for service in the House of
Representatives is 25. For the Senate it is 30 (Art. I, sect. 3).
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citizens age 35 or older) is greater than that needed to drive a car or vote. However, perusal of
the scheme of regulations suggests that, although crude assumptions about maturity play an
important role, age grading policies are often shaped by other considerations as well. Examination
of specific policies suggests that lines are drawn on the basis of a number of diverse policy
concerns. Concern about youth welfare, protection of parental authority and societal benefit are
all a part of the mix, as well as straightforward administrative convenience. On issues such as
abortion access, political controversy and compromise have played a powerful role in the way in
which the boundary of childhood is set. In the discussion that follows, I examine the complexity of
age grading, and extract some lessons from the diverse responses that policy makers have offered
to the question, “When does childhood end?”
A. The Categorical Approach--Age of Majority
1. The Logic of a Presumptive Age of Majority
The age of majority is the natural place to begin,. The common law age of majority was
age 21, apparently because, in the Middle Ages, most men were presumed capable of carrying
armor at this age.32 Currently, legal adulthood begins at age 18.33 This milestone signals the end
of parental authority and responsibility, as well as the withdrawal of the state from its protective
parens patriae role. The financial support obligation of parents generally ends when children
attains the age of majority, as does parents’ common law right to their children’s earnings.34 The
safety net of government support and protection is also terminated; for the most part, federal and
state financial support, medical services, and abuse and neglect jurisdiction end when children

32

S. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, LOWERING THE VOTING AGE TO 18, S. REP. NO. 92-26 at 5 (1st Sess.
1971). See VIRGINIA GRACE COOK, THE AGE OF MAJORITY 6 (1972) (describing the historical development of the
age of majority.
33

For example, the Virginia code provides “for the purposes of all laws of the Commonwealth [of
Virginia] including common law, case law and statutory law, unless an exception is specifically provided in this
Code, a person shall be an adult, shall be of full age and shall reach the age of majority when he becomes eighteen
years of age.” Va. Code Ann. § 1-13.42 (Michie 2000). In California, “An adult is an individual who is 18 years
of age or older.” Cal Fam Code § 6501 (Reed 2000).
34

Some states have adjusted the age for terminating the parental support obligation to accommodate the
post-majority dependency of college students. See t.a.n 47 to 51 below.
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become legal adults at age 18.35
On reaching the age of majority, individuals acquire most of the legal capacities necessary
to function as citizens and members of society. Legal adults have the right to make decisions
about domicile and medical treatment, and the legal capacity to enter binding contracts, sign
leases, purchase real estate, and make wills.36 Upon attaining the age of majority, individuals are
also accorded the rights and privileges of citizens, including the right to serve on juries and
(perhaps of greatest symbolic importance) the right to vote.37
The designation of a categorical legal age of majority can be understood as reflecting a
crude judgment about maturity and competence. Individuals at the specified age are assumed to
be mature enough to function in society as adults, to care for themselves, and to make their own
self- interested decisions. Before this threshold is crossed, authority to make these decisions rests
largely either with the parents, who can be assumed to act in the child’s interest, or with the state.
Empirical evidence from developmental psychology supports that by age eighteen (and certainly
by age twenty-one), most individuals attain the presumed adult competence in many domains.
Although the process of psychological development and maturing continues into the adult years,
there are only modest differences between late adolescents and adults in decisionmaking
capacity.38 In fact, one likely effect of the categorical approach is that minors will sometimes

35

See e.g., 28 U.S.C.A. § 1738A(b)(1)(Reed 2000) (“child” for purposes of Uniform Child Custody
Jurisdiction Act means person under age 18); 42 U.S.C.A. § 619 (Reed 2000) (“child” for purposes of Social
Security Act includes children under 18 or those under 19 who attend post-secondary or vocational school fulltime); Fla. Stat. § 39.41(2)(a) (1993) (jurisdiction over ‘dependent children ends at age 18); 705 I.L.C.S. § 405/11 et seq. (West 1994) (abuse and neglect jurisdiction extends to minors under age 18); N.J.Stat. 9:6-8.21 (2000)
(abused or neglected child means a child under age 18); Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-103(1)(a)(I) (Supp. 1998)
(abused or neglected child means a minor under age).

36
37

See note 33 supra.
See t.a.n. 43 to 46 infra.

38

Developmental research indicates that most persons, by age sixteen, have “the ability to engage in
hypothetical and logical decision-making..., to demonstrate reliable episodic memory..., to extend thinking into the
future..., to engage in advanced social perspective-taking..., and to understand and articulate one's motives and
psychological state.” Steinberg and Cauffman, supra note 24 at 402. Generally, late adolescence (age 17 to 19) is
marked by the ability to delay gratification, to think ideas through, to make independent decisions, to compromise,
and to set goals. Late Adolescent Development, Center for Adolescent Studies at Indiana University,
<http://education.indiana.edu/cas/adol/development.html>. Accompanying these abilities is greater self-reliance
and emotional stability, a higher level of concern for the future, and acceptance of social institutions and cultural
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continue to be treated as legal children when they are competent to make decisions or perform
adult functions. For this reason, this approach has been challenged, sometimes successfully, on the
ground that it deprives competent youths of the ability to exercise rights and privileges that adult
citizens enjoy.39
The use of a bright line rule to designate the end of childhood ignores individual variations
in developmental maturity as well as varying maturity demands across the range of legal rights and
responsibilities. Nonetheless, it generally functions quite well. For most purposes, no great harm
results from postponing adult legal status until the designated age, or from giving parents legal
authority and thereby involving them in their adolescent children’s lives. Most adolescents have
no pressing need to execute contracts, and if they do, parental involvement is probably desirable
in most cases. Moreover, an extended dependency period offers benefits in the form of entitlement
to support and other protections of childhood. Indeed, if maintaining parents’ enthusiasm for
their obligations toward their children is important, retention of parental authority may be
worthwhile - - as long as parents have no serious conflict of interest with their children.40 Political
support for special governmental benefits for children and adolescents may also be strengthened
by maintaining the bright line between childhood and adulthood for most purposes.41
A bright line age of majority is a clear signal; all who deal with the young person
traditions. Id.
39

Gary B. Melton, Toward “Personhood” for Adolescents: Autonomy and Privacy as Values in Public
Policy, 38 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 99 (1983); Lois A. Weithorn and Susan B. Campbell, The Competency of Children
and Adolescents to Make Informed Treatment Decisions, 53 CHILD DEV. 1589 (1982). In Bellotti v. Baird, the
Supreme Court accepted the claim that mature minors should not be deprived of abortion rights. 443 U.S. 622,
647 (1979). Not all challenges using developmental arguments have been successful. The Supreme Court has
sometimes rejected developmental arguments against abortion restrictions. In Hartigan v. Zbaraz ( 484 U.S. 171
(1987), the Court rejected developmental argument of the American Psychological Association. Brief for Amicus
Curiae – American Psychological Ass’n, Hartigan v. Zbaraz, 484 U.S. 171 (1987) (No. 85-673)(hereafter APA
Brief)
40

In earlier work, Robert Scott and I develop this argument. Withdrawing parental authority and
autonomy (either by extensive state supervision or by treating children as legal adults) may undermine parents’
motivation to fulfill their obligations. See E. Scott and R. Scott, Parents as Fiduciaries, supra note 9 at 2430.
41

Although policies that treat youths as children for some purposes and adults for others might be
perfectly coherent, the public may believe that there should be rough parity between rights and responsibilities.
Thus, children’s rights advocates in the 1980's who argued for broad rights of self determination for adolescents
(often on the ground that they were very like adults in their capacities), may have undermined the effectiveness of
arguments for lenient policies toward youth crime. See E. Scott, Judgment and Reasoning, supra note 5.
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understand that he does -- or does not- - have legal capacity. A more tailored approach that
attempts to confer adult status in different domains on the basis of a more targeted assessment of
maturity is likely to generate uncertainty and error. Moreover, it almost certainly would be
administratively less efficient. A strategy of customized age grading introduces complexity and
cost to legal policy, as it involves multiple judgments about the appropriate maturity threshold for
a broad range of tasks and functions. Most cumbersome of all would be an approach that confers
adult legal rights or responsibilities on the basis of individualized assessments of maturity.
Because such a strategy is costly and burdensome, predictably it is only employed when the stakes
are high.42
The upshot is that a categorical approach that treats individuals below a designated age as
legal minors for most purposes works well, despite some inevitable distortion of the
developmental capacities of young persons, as long as that age corresponds roughly to some
threshold of developmental readiness to assume the responsibilities and privileges of adulthood.
Because of the advantages of this categorical approach, variations that depart from the
presumptive age should attract our interest. These variations can be explained as serving some
political or social goal that would be undermined by adherence to the conventional boundary of
childhood.
2. Determining the Age of Majority- - The Passage of the 26th Amendment
What determines the location of the presumptive boundary between childhood and
adulthood? Clearly, it is based on some rough assessment about the level of maturity required to
function as an adult in society, but (also clearly), no single age is dictated by developmental
considerations. In the past generation, the boundary has shifted downward, in response to the
passage of the 26th Amendment, lowering the age at which citizens have a right to vote in federal
and state elections. The social and political forces that led to this constitutional reform, and the
arguments made in support of its passage, provide some interesting lessons about the way in
which the presumptive boundary of childhood is drawn.
The right to vote has long been the defining marker of legal adulthood and the age of

42

Individualized hearings are used to determine whether particular young persons should be treated as
legal adults or as children in at least two contexts. First, many statutes regulating adolescents’ access to abortion
provide for judicial by pass hearings to evaluate maturity. See t.a.n. 72 to 77 infra. Also, one means of deciding
whether youths accused of crimes will be tried as adults is the judicial transfer hearing. See t.a.n 105 to 106 infra.
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majority has been linked with this important symbol of full fledged citizenship. Like many other
legal rights, the right to vote is withheld from minors because of assumptions about
developmental immaturity. It is assumed that education and an informed understanding of the
issues are important to political participation in a democracy, and that adults will be more likely to
meet these criteria than children and adolescents.43 Although this assumption may not hold in
many cases - - many adolescents would be better informed voters than many adults - - the
withholding of the right to vote from minors has generated little controversy in recent years.44
This is probably because of a combination of two factors suggested above. The administrative
cost of identifying minors who are “competent” to exercise their voting rights would be
substantial, and the cost of postponing the opportunity to exercise voting rights does not seem to
be a great deprivation.
If the latter point is true, how can we explain the extensive effort undertaken in the late
1960's to amend the United States Constitution to extend voting rights to 18 year old citizens?45
First, the political context and climate were important. The 26th Amendment was enacted in the
midst of the Viet Nam War, when many legal minors between the ages of 18 and 21 were drafted
into military service and sent into battle. Moreover, across the country, college students involved
in the civil rights and anti-war protest movements demonstrated an interest in political
participation and a commitment to social change. The Senate committee that recommended the
enactment of the 26th Amendment emphasized these political facts. It also emphasized that the
young adults who would be enfranchised under the new amendment were “mentally and

43

For a comprehensive discussion on the history of the voting age in America, see WENDEL CULTICE,
YOUTH’S BATTLE FOR THE BALLOT: A HISTORY OF THE VOTING AGE IN AMERICA (1992). In this work, Ian
McGowan, then Executive Director of Youth Franchise Coalition, is quoted as saying that 18 was a better age for
voting than 16 or 17 because 18 is the age that most persons graduate from high school and take on adult
responsibilities. Id. at 105-106. But see Why Not Seventeen, 22 NAT’L REV. 244 (1970) (“We can’t think of a
single argument for a voting age of 18 that doesn’t apply just as well to seventeen.”). For an overview of why 18year-olds deserved the vote, see S. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, LOWERING THE VOTING AGE TO 18, S. REP. NO. 9226 (1st Sess. 1971).
44

Thus, voting rights were not an issue in the children’s rights movement in the 1980's, when advocates
argued for broad self determination rights for adolescents. See Melton, supra note 39.
45

For a discussion of the political movement that led to the passage of the 26th Amendment, see WENDEL
CULTICE, supra note 43. Cultice describes a youth movement to lower the voting age in the late 1960s, that
became nationally recognized as LUV (Let Us Vote), and spread to over 3000 high schools and 400 colleges.
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emotionally capable of full participation in our democratic form of government.46 Finally, the
report noted that legal minors were treated as adults for the purposes of criminal responsibility
and punishment in all states, and that many were engaged in adult roles as employees and
taxpayers. The common law age of majority was dismissed as a matter of historical accident.
A couple of points about this political initiative are interesting. First, the Amendment’s
supporters believed it was important to emphasize that the common law boundary between
childhood and adulthood distorted developmental reality. The argument for lowering the age of
majority was based in part on an empirical claim that, for most purposes, psychological maturity
was achieved by age 18, suggesting a view that legal status should follow intuitions about
developmental maturity. Another important theme is that parity should exist between rights and
responsibilities. On this view, fairness required the extension of voting rights to 18 year olds
because they were subject to the most onerous responsibility of citizenship (military service) and
were often held legally accountable for their behavior under the criminal law. There is little
question that the image of young persons dying for their country in Viet Nam who were not
deemed mature enough to participate in the electoral process carried much symbolic weight in the
political process. It goes a long way toward explaining the timing of this constitutional reform.
Finally, this reform reveals the extent to which legal childhood and adulthood are social and
political constructs, rather than simply products of scientific understanding of human
development. One implicit goal of the reform was to reconceptualize college student protesters
from immature troublemakers who were “outside the system” into citizens with a stake in
democratic processes. The broader point, of course, is that young persons between 18 and 21
years were recast as legal adults in large part because of circumstances in the social and political
environment.
3. The Limitations of the Categorical Approach--the Case of Child Support
After the passage of the 26th Amendment in 1971, the age of majority was lowered to age
18 for many other purposes, through legislative and judicial action at the state and federal level.47

46

SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, supra note 32.

47

See Virginia and California statutes cited in note 33 supra. See Charles F. Wilson, Note, But Daddy,
Why Can’t I Go to College? The Frightening De-Kline of Support for Children’s Post-Secondary Education, 37
B.C. L. REV 1099, 1101-1102 (1996) (discussing the role of the 26th Amendment in the lowering of the age of
majority).
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Although much of this reform was uncontroversial, in one area, the legal change was quite
problematic. Many courts interpreted the legal reform to require that non-custodial parents’
obligation to provide financial support for their minor children must end at age 18 (because by
definition, recipients were no longer minors).48 The impact of this downward shift suggests why a
bright line rule defining the boundaries of childhood sometimes is inadequate.
The issue of when child support obligation should end continues to be the subject of
debate. In many ways, modern 18 year olds are ready to function as legal adults. However,
college attendance has become the norm as preparation for a successful life, 49 extending the
period of financial dependency on parents for many young people. If the lowering of the age of
majority to age 18 (when many children are still in high school) signifies the end of parents’ legal
obligation to provide financial support to their children, many children will obtain a college
education only with great difficulty - - if at all. In intact families, parents who have the financial
means usually support their children’s college education, implicitly acknowledging that, in this
domain, an extension of childhood status is important to their children’s welfare. Non-custodial
parents may be less likely to identify their own interest with that of children with whom they no
longer share a home. This may justify imposing a legal obligation on these parents to act toward
their children as they would had the family remained together - - even though no such legal
obligation is imposed on parents in intact families. In fact, non-custodial parents often are subject
to formal legal mandates not applicable to parents in intact families --support for a minor child’s
private school education, for example.50 A legal directive is necessary because non-custodial
48

Some state courts have found that divorced parents are not obligated to pay for their children’s college
expenses because they are only responsible during the child’s minority. See Cariseo v. Cariseo, 459 A.2d 523
(Conn. 1983); Jones v. Jones, 257 S.E.2d 537, 538 (Ga. 1979); Peterson v. Peterson, 319 N.W.2d 414 (Minn.
1982). Other states do not extend child support to college expenses because married parents would not have the
same obligation. See Dowling v. Dowling, 679 P.2d 480 (Alaska 1984); In re Plummer, 735 P.2d 165 (Colo.
1987); Grapin v. Grapin, 450 So.2d 853 (Fla. 1984); Curtis v. Kline, 666 A.2d 265 (Pa. 1995) (holding legislation
allowing for post-majority support for college by non-custodial parents to be violative of the equal protection clause
of the U.S. Constitution).
49

“Few things are as certain as that people with more education earn more money.” Education and
Earnings: 1987, 35 OCCUPATIONAL OUTLOOK Q. 25 (1991). According to the Census Bureau, persons with
degrees beyond high school earn, on average, more than twice that of persons who hold only a high school diploma
($2,339 vs. $1,080 mean monthly earnings). Rosalind R. Bruno, What’s It Worth? Field of Training and
Economic Status: 1993, U.S. Bureau of the Census, CURRENT POPULATION REP., Series P70-51 at 1 (1995).
50

See e.g. Haw. Rev. Stat. § 576D-7 (1985 and Supp. 1991) (private school expenses can be considered
when calculating child support payments); La. R.S. 9:315.6 (expense of a special or private school may be added to
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parents cannot be counted on to act in their children’s interest.
Some courts and legislatures have authorized the extension of parents’ child support
obligation beyond the age of majority to provide financial support for college.51 The underlying
premise is that children’s financial dependency on their parents as they acquire a college education
justifies extending the legal boundary of childhood beyond its presumptive limit. The recognition
by law makers that, in this domain, older adolescents are not autonomous adults enhances general
social welfare (by creating more educated citizens), as well as the welfare of youths who receive
the benefit.
B. Medical Decisionmaking - A Case Study in Legal Line-Drawing
The legal regulation of medical treatment of children and adolescents conforms, in
general, to the categorical approach under which childhood ends at the age of majority. There are
many exceptions, however, under which the adolescents are given adult status. In the regulation
of abortion, moreover, some states have adopted procedures that implicitly create a special
category for adolescents. In its variation and complexity, the legal regulation of minors’ access to
medical treatment offers a rich context in which to examine the construction of the legal
boundaries of childhood.
Most medical treatment of minors requires the consent of their parents. Thus, adolescents
can not obtain routine medical treatment on their own, and, unlike adults, can not refuse treatment
that their physicians and parents conclude is necessary.52 The basis for parental authority in this

the basic child support obligation " . . . to meet the particular educational needs of the [children]."); Litmans v.
Litmans, 673 A.2d 382 (Pa. Super. 1996) (divorced parents have a duty to provide for their minor child's private
school education as long as such an education is a reasonable expense, citing 42 Pa.C.S.A. §1910.16-5(l)). But see
Rizzo v. Rizzo, No. FA 90-0439639S, 1996 Conn. Super. LEXIS 592 at *4 (Conn. Super. Ct. Feb. 8, 1996)
(requiring the non-custodian parent to pay for expenses for a child's attendance at a private school...is generally not
a support obligation of a parent”). See generally Hoefers v. Jones 672 A.2d 1299 (N.J. Super. 1994) (list of criteria
used in varying jurisdictions to determining when non-custodial parent must pay for private school expenses).
51

See LeClair v. LeClair, 624 A.2d 1350(N.H. 1993) (upholding legislation requiring college support for
children of non-custodial parents); Childers v. Childers, 575 P.2d 201 (Wash. 1978) (non-custodial parent must
pay college costs after statute was changed to read ‘dependent’ rather than ‘minor’). See also ELLMAN, KURTZ &
SCOTT, FAMILY LAW (1998) at 499-501; Glen A. Smith, Educational Support Obligations of Non-Custodial
Parents, 36 RUTGERS L. REV. 588 (1984).
52

Whether many physicians would provide non-essential medical treatment to an objecting adolescent on
the basis of parental consent is uncertain. For example, if parents were intent on their protesting child receiving
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area is relatively straightforward. Medical treatment must be based on competent informed
consent - - otherwise the treatment provider commits a battery on the patient.53 Because minors
are presumed incompetent to give informed consent, parental consent is necessary. Although
developmental psychology evidence indicates that older minors are mature enough in their
cognitive development to make competent medical decisions,54 giving parents legal authority
usually makes good sense. It reduces uncertainty and cost for medical service providers, who
would otherwise need to assess the competence of their young patients. Beyond this, legal
authority over health care decisions encourages parents to fulfill their general responsibilities to
provide for their children’s welfare - - and to pay their children’s medical bills! Most medical
treatments present no conflict of interest; parents can be counted on to have their children’s
interests at heart in making treatment decisions. Thus, in requiring parental consent for most
medical treatments, lawmakers adopt the conventional boundary of childhood for the conventional
reasons.
1. The Mature Minor Doctrine and Minors Consent Statutes
There are many exceptions to this general rule, however. The requirement of parental
consent is set aside under certain circumstances and for particular kinds of treatment, giving
adolescents legal authority to make their own medical decisions. The policy objectives of these
exceptions vary, but most involve circumstances in which general social welfare and the welfare
of the young person needing treatment would be undermined if parental consent were required
and the traditional boundary of childhood were maintained.
The most well established of these exceptions historically is the mature minor doctrine.
Under this doctrine, legally valid consent can be obtained from an older competent minor for
routine beneficial medical treatment or in an emergency situation. This exception facilitates
necessary treatment when parental consent may be hard to get, under circumstances in which it is

cosmetic plastic surgery, most surgeons likely would decline to perform the surgery. The American Academy of
Pediatrics guidelines advise against treatment under these circumstances. Committee on Bioethics, American
Academy of Pediatrics, Informed Consent, Parental Permission, and Assent in Pediatric Practice (RE9510), 95
PEDIATRICS 314 (1995).
53

See e.g., Younts v. St. Francis Hospital and School of Nursing, Inc., 469 P.2d 330 (Kan. 1970) (“A
surgical operation on the body of a person is a technical battery or trespass, regardless of result, unless the person
or some authorized person consents to it”)
54

Melton; Weithorn and Campbell, supra note 39.
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assumed that parents would likely consent. It also protects medical providers from liability for
what may be only technical violations of the informed consent requirement.55
Aside from the general mature minor rule, legislatures in many states have enacted more
targeted statutes, under which minors are deemed adults for the purpose of consenting to
particular kinds of treatments. These typically include treatment for sexually transmitted diseases,
substance abuse, mental health problems, and birth control and pregnancy.56 Minors consent
statutes typically do not include a minimum age at which a minor is deemed an adult, but, because
of the nature of the specified conditions and treatments, only adolescents are likely to seek
treatment. Implicitly, these laws assume that the young patients are competent to consent to the
treatment, an assumption that is likely valid for mid-adolescents.
These statutes are curious in that they give minors adult legal status out of concern for
youthful vulnerability. No one argues that minors should be deemed adults because they are
particularly mature in making decisions in these treatment contexts. Rather the focus is on the
harm of requiring parental consent. The targeted treatments all involve situations in which the
traditional assumption - - that parents can be counted on to respond to their children’s medical
needs in a way that promotes the child’s interest- - simply might not hold. For example, some
parents may become angry upon learning of their child’s drug use or sexual activity. Moreover,
even if most parents would act to promote their children’s welfare, adolescents may be reluctant
to get help if they are required to inform their parents about their condition, either because they
fear their parents’ reactions or because they do not want to disclose private information.57

55

For a comprehensive discussion of the mature minor doctrine, see Walter Wadlington, Minors and
Health Care: The Age of Consent, 11 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 115 (1973). The principles of the mature minor doctrine
seem to be influential, even in jurisdictions that have not formally adopted the doctrine. See Angela R. Holder,
Minors’ Rights to Consent to Medical Care, 257 JAMA 3400 (1983) (arguing that there have been very few cases
in which a physician has been sued for non-negligent care of an adolescent without parental consent).
56

VA. CODE §54.1-2969 (Michie 1999)(minors deemed adults for purposes of consenting to these
treatments.). See also ALA. CODE § 22-8-6 (2000)(a minor may consent to treatment for pregnancy, venereal
disease, drug dependency, alcohol toxicity or any reportable disease); 22 ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22 §§ 1502,
1823, 1908 (West 1999)(a minor may consent to treatment for abuse of alcohol or drugs, emotional or
psychological problems, venereal disease, sexual assault and family planning).
57

See Wadlington, supra note 55 at 122. But see Susan F. Newcomer & J. Richard Udry, Parent-Child
Communication and Adolescent Sexual Behavior, 17 Fam. Plan. Persp. 169, 174 (1985) (“minors are frequently
ignorant of their parents’ attitudes toward sex-related issues” and minors fears about parental reactions may not
reflect the parents’ actual beliefs or attitudes). According to a 1980 study, requiring parental consent or notice
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Removing this obstacle encourages them to seek treatment which may be critically important to
their health. Of course, society also has an interest in reducing the incidence of sexually
transmitted diseases, substance abuse, teen age pregnancy and mental illness. Together these
social benefits largely explain why lawmakers shift the boundary of childhood for the purpose of
encouraging treatment of these conditions.
2. The Battle over Adolescents’ Access to Abortion
In the generation since Roe v. Wade, legislatures and courts have struggled with the issue
of whether the government can regulate access to abortion for adolescents more restrictively than
would be allowed for adult women.58 On this issue, the boundary between childhood and
adulthood has been the subject of intense legal and political controversy, pitting advocates for
adolescent self-determination, who describe pregnant teens as adults, against conservatives who
depict these minors as children who should be subject to their parents’ authority.59 Both sides
care deeply about this issue, and both have a political agenda that is linked to the larger
ideological contest over abortion.60 Not surprisingly, under these circumstances, the resulting
legal framework is complex and the product of political compromise. In many states, law makers
regulating adolescents’ access to abortion reject the conventional strategies of legislative line

before issuing contraceptives to teenagers would “lead many of them to abandon contraception or to use less
effective methods.” Aida Torres, Jacqueline D. Forrest, & Susan Eisman, Telling Parents: Clinic Policies and
Adolescents’ Use of Family Planning and Abortion Services, 12 Fam. Plan. Persp. 284, 291 (1980).
58

Gary B. Melton, supra note 39; Robert Mnookin, Bellotti v. Baird: A Hard Case, 150 in IN THE
INTEREST OF CHILDREN: ADVOCACY, LAW REFORM AND PUBLIC POLICY, 153, R.H. MNOOKIN, ED. (1985)
(describing the advocacy movement against restrictions on adolescent abortion and the challenge of Massachusetts
statute in Bellotti v. Baird.)
59

Language in Supreme Court opinions illustrates this rhetorical battle. See t.a.n. notes 27 & 28 supra.
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For example, the National Organization for Women a prominent pro-choice group, has actively
opposed parental notification and consent laws. Kristin Thomas, Back Alley Laws: Redefining Anti-Abortion
Legislation in THE ABORTION CONTROVERSY: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 270 (Eva R. Rubin, ed. 1995). On the
other hand, the Catholic Church and fundamentalist Protestant groups, that are opposed to abortion generally have
advocated for restrictions on adolescent access to abortion, including parental consent and notification provisions.
Cynthia Gorney, ARTICLES OF FAITH: A FRONTLINE HISTORY OF THE ABORTION WARS 165 (1998); Basile J.
Uddo, The Public Law of Abortion: A Constitutional and Statutory Review of the Present and Future Legal
Landscape in ABORTION AND PUBLIC POLICY: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY INVESTIGATION WITHIN THE CATHOLIC
TRADITION 163, 175-176 (R. Randall Rainey, S.J. & Gerard Magill, eds.1996). See generally CENTER FOR
REPRODUCTIVE LAW AND POLICY, TIPPING THE SCALES: THE CHRISTIAN RIGHT’S LEGAL CRUSADE AGAINST
CHOICE (1998).
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drawing and binary classification. Rather they treat adolescents as a distinct legal category,
different from children and adults, and employ judicial hearings to classify teens on a case-by-case
basis.61

I will argue that this costly regulatory scheme offers little in the way of social benefit.
Many features of an adolescent’s decision to terminate her pregnancy distinguish abortion

from routine medical decisions, and give rise to arguments that pregnant teens should be deemed
adults in this context. Advocates for self determination in the abortion debate focus on the
constitutional importance of reproductive choice, and argue that most adolescents possess the
developmental maturity to make the decision on their own.62 Moreover, there are some notable
differences between the right of privacy implicated in the abortion decision and other important
rights of citizens that are not extended to minors, regardless of their competence. One justification
for deferring many legal rights (the right to vote, for example) until the age of majority is that
postponement results in no great deprivation. In contrast, the decision about whether or not to
have a child can not be postponed, and it has enormous consequences for the individual.63
Moreover, given the health risks of pregnancy and childbirth, and the consequences for the girl’s
future welfare, the paternalistic argument for making abortion available to minors is a powerful
one.
This line of analysis challenges the wisdom of the traditional classification of adolescents
as legal children in the abortion context, and argues against governmental prohibition of access to
abortion for minors. But should parents be legally excluded from their traditional role of making
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Some states adhere to a standard binary classification, and adopt the approach of the minors’ consent
statutes. See t.a.n. 66. Others would clearly choose to classify pregnant minors as children, but are prevented from
doing so by constitutional constraints imposed by the Supreme Court. Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v.
Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976)(parental consent requirement in Missouri statute struck down).
62

Gary Melton argues that adolescents are capable of making the abortion decision without adult
intervention, either parental or judicial – that research indicates that adolescents are not far from adults in their
decision-making capacity. Melton, supra note 39. The American Psychological Association agreed. In its amicus
brief to the Supreme Court in Hartigan v. Zbaraz, the APA noted that adolescents do not differ from adults in their
formal operational thinking (i.e. the ability to understand future consequences) and moral reasoning, and thus, that
the statutory restrictions at issue could not be justified. The Court was not persuaded by the developmental
argument. See A.P.A. Brief, supra note 40. See also Weithorn and Campbell, supra note 39 at 1595 (noting
findings of abortion-specific study that shows adolescents age 14 and up to be just as capable as adults in making
decisions about abortion).
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In Bellotti v. Baird, Justice Powell noted this attribute of abortion. Bellotti, 443 U.S. 622 at 634.

24

important decisions for their minor children?64 In many regards, the arguments for allowing
minors to consent to abortion treatment without involving their parents are similar to those made
in support of minors’ consent statutes. Here, as in the context of treatment for sexually
transmitted diseases or substance abuse, the interests of parents and child may conflict. The
pregnancy may be unwelcome evidence that the child has rejected the parents’ moral code.
Moreover, some parents may strongly oppose abortion on moral or religious grounds, and refuse
to consent to a procedure that they find abhorrent. In short, the parents’ view of the right decision
may be based on their own values and interests rather than on concern for their child’s health and
welfare per se. Even if this is not so, many teens may fear their parents’ response and postpone
dealing with the pregnancy if parental involvement is required for abortion. This postponement
could result in later (and riskier) abortions. Under these circumstances, the state might
legitimately intervene to protect the child’s welfare by allowing adolescents to obtain abortion
without parental involvement.
An important difference between abortion and treatment for substance abuse or sexually
transmitted diseases, of course, is that the abortion decision involves a highly contested moral
choice that is absent in those other treatments. There is only one right answer to the question of
whether a teen with a drug problem should get treatment. Many would object to that description
of the decision to terminate pregnancy. Thus, a core issue in classifying pregnant teens as adults
or children is whether parents (or courts) should have the authority to impose their values on the
pregnant adolescent or whether her values should be determinative. In these terms, the argument
for shifting the boundary of childhood downward is straightforward. The pregnant teen possesses
sufficient maturity to make this decision, and indeed, if she completes the pregnancy, she will be
subject to the legal obligations of parenthood. She also has the most important stake in the
outcome. As Justice Blackmun indicated in Roe v. Wade, an important justifications for giving
control of this decision to the woman is that an unwanted pregnancy imposes a substantial burden
on the individual.65 There is no reason to assume that this burden would be felt less acutely by an
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adolescent than by an adult woman. Moreover, the burdens and health risks of pregnancy and
child birth are even greater with the younger teen. Thus, while her self determination claim may be
weaker, the paternalistic argument that her parents’opposition to abortion should not be
dispositive is stronger.
The response of law makers to this controversial dilemma has varied. Some states have
adopted the approach of the minors consent statutes, classifying pregnant teens as adults for the
purpose of making this decision.66 Others have downplayed the differences between abortion and
other medical decisions, and have sought to retain parental authority to the extent possible. Over
the last generation, the constitutional parameters of minors’ abortion rights have emerged in a
series of United States Supreme Court decisions.67 The resulting constitutional framework
authorizes states to subject adolescents to procedural requirements that would clearly be
unacceptable for adults. At the same time, the Court has made clear that abortion is different from
other medical decisions, and that pregnant teens can not be simply classified as children subject to
their parents’ authority.
The Court has clarified (to some extent) the constitutional limits of state regulation of
adolescent abortion by proposing a procedural framework that seeks to accommodate the
competing interests of the pregnant minor, her parents and the state. Under this framework,
states must allow a mature minor to make the abortion decision without parental consent, but can

family already unable, psychologically and otherwise, to care for it. In other cases,...the additional difficulties and
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require that she demonstrate in a judicial proceeding that she is mature enough to make the
decision.68 Even younger teens can not be legislatively presumed to be unable to make a mature
abortion decision.69 If the court finds a minor not to be mature, a determination must be made
(under the state’s parens patriae authority) of whether authorizing abortion without parental
involvement is in her best interest.70 (Of course, the minor who is willing to tell her parents can
obtain abortion with their consent.) The Supreme Court has also upheld statutory requirements
that give parents notice of their child’ abortion, without authority to withhold consent. 71
The heart of this regulatory scheme is the judicial by-pass hearing, required in many states
as a predicate to assigning adult status to the pregnant minor.72 Under this approach, in contrast
to most age grading policies, the boundary between childhood and adulthood is not a legislatively
mandated bright line; rather, it is set by an individualized evaluation of the minor’s maturity. In
by-pass hearings, courts apply an indeterminate legal standard, following Justice Powell’s rather
vague prescription in Bellotti v. Baird that the pregnant adolescent who is “mature and well
enough informed to make her own decision” about abortion be authorized to do so without
parental consent.73 Not surprisingly, perhaps, judicial judgments about where the line between
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childhood and adulthood should be drawn often seem to depend on attitudes about abortion and
teen pregnancy. Some conservative courts raise the bar very high, evaluating petitioners under a
standard for general maturity that most minors are unlikely to meet. One is sometimes left to
conclude that a “mature” minor would have consulted with her parents (and thus have no need for
the judicial by-pass procedure), and probably would never have been foolish enough to become
pregnant.74 Other courts appear to rubber- stamp petitions by pregnant teens. For example,
Robert Mnookin found that Massachusetts judges, called upon to implement a statute based on
the guidelines set forth by Justice Powell in Bellotti, almost invariably ordered abortion without
informing parents, even on the rare occasions when they concluded that a petitioner was not a
“mature minor.”75 These courts appear to have been motivated largely by paternalistic concern
for the health and welfare of pregnant minors, rather than by any deference for adolescent
autonomy.76 As Mnookin asks rhetorically, “[H]ow could a judge determine that it is in the
interest of a minor to give birth to a child if she is too immature even to decide to have an
abortion?”77
The legal framework endorsed by the Court can be understood as an effort to find an
acceptable resolution to a highly contested dispute about the boundary of childhood - - a dispute
that has more to do with conflicting attitudes about abortion itself than with views on parental
authority or the maturity or autonomy interests of adolescents. In defining the constitutional
restrictions on state authority to classify adolescents as children in this context, the Court allows
psychological research on adolescents capacity to consent to abortion). An informed consent limits the ability of
judges to make decisions on the basis of their own values and attitudes.
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states to limit adolescent abortion rights to a circumscribed group of mature individuals. At the
same time, it prohibits categorical classification of pregnant teens as children solely on the basis of
age. This regulatory scheme, with its emphasis on the by-pass hearing, creates an elaborate and
costly procedural mechanism for classifying adolescents as children or adults. In effect, however,
the framework also creates a distinct legal category for adolescents - -and thus is a rare departure
from the conventional binary classification of adolescents as either adults or children. On the one
hand, even the mature pregnant teen is not quite an adult; the requirement that she demonstrate
her maturity creates a substantive burden on her efforts to obtain abortion services that likely
would be unacceptable for adult women. Moreover, even mature teens may be subject to parental
notice requirements.78 On the other hand, traditional parental authority to make medical decisions
for their children is curtailed by the availability of the by- pass hearing and by the right of mature
minors to make their own decisions.79
The endorsement of this unique regulatory scheme may indicate that, in this context, the
Court recognizes that adolescents are neither children or fully mature adults. More clearly, the
framework represents an effort to accommodate competing legal and political interests on a
sharply contested moral issue. It may be that, under these circumstances, the Court deems the
creation of an intermediate category to be the only viable solution. Perhaps the endorsement of
the by-pass hearing reflects a view that the classification decision can be better resolved by courts
than in the politically charged legislative arena. The Massachusetts experience suggests that courts
in that state usually classify minors as adults to promote their welfare, a response that is
conventional in other settings. The process is costly and cumbersome however, and the statutory
solution seems unsatisfactory to most observers.80 There is little evidence that it promotes the
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interests of pregnant teens or responds to their developmental needs. The requirement of a bypass hearing leads to costly delay and seems likely to result in later abortion in many cases- - in
part, because it will be viewed as an obstacle by many girls. Moreover, under the by-pass model,
judicial attitudes about abortion may color decisions about maturity and best interest, creating
uncertainty and inconsistency. Setting aside the perceived need for constitutional compromise,
this regulatory framework has little to recommend it. Legislatures adhering to the conventional
objectives that guide legal regulation of minors would focus on the health and welfare of the
pregnant teen and on the social costs of teen pregnancy. From this perspective, the creation of an
intermediate category of adolescence in this context holds no apparent advantage over the
legislative line-drawing and binary classification of the minors’ consent statutes.
C. Summary
The law’s approach to defining childhood turns out not to be as incoherent as it at first
appears. A categorical demarcation of the legal age of majority functions quite well for most
purposes, even though it may not mirror the developmental transition to adulthood of many
adolescents, or even most adolescents for some purposes. When that line is shifted, some
important policy objective is being served. Legal regulation lowering or raising the threshold of
legal adulthood usually reflects dual objectives; it serves both the public interest and the interest of
the adolescents who are classified either as legal adults or children. Sometimes, as with laws
extending parents’ support obligation through college, the goal of promoting the welfare of young
persons seems to predominate - - although investment in education also carries societal benefits.
In other contexts, policy makers pursue both paternalistic goals and public protection. This is the
case with the minors consent laws and with federal law which prohibits alcohol use by young
persons who are legal adults.81 On the whole, legal policy facilitates the transition to adulthood
through a series of bright line rules that reflect society’s collective interest in young citizen’s
healthy development to productive adulthood.
The legal framework seems to work well in another way. For the most part, as I have
suggested, law makers employ a rather simplistic scheme that ignores developmental transition
and categorizes adolescents as either children or adults. Although some critics have lamented this
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approach and argued for policies that are tailored to respond to the exigencies of this
developmental stage,82 there is little evidence that, in most contexts, the interests of adolescents
are harmed by a regime of binary classification. Creating a separate legal category for
adolescents, would add complexity but generally with little promised payoff. Indeed, the effect of
a legal regime that includes a series of legislative bright line rules is to extend adult rights and
responsibilities over an extended period of time into early adulthood, without incurring the costs
of establishing an intermediate category, or of undertaking a case-by-case inquiry into maturity.
Perhaps this is the lesson of abortion regulation. In that context, burdensome procedural
requirements create social and administrative costs, and there is little evidence that the welfare of
adolescents is advanced through the creation of an intermediate category. Occasionally, to be
sure, useful exceptions to the binary classification scheme are introduced. For example, under
recent statutory reforms, young drivers are accorded the adult privilege of operating motor
vehicles, but subject to special restrictions as they gain experience and learn responsibility.83 In
this setting, youth welfare and social welfare are both served by the creation of an intermediate
category.
The legal account of childhood up to this point is for the most part a success story. It is
also a story with simple themes, in part because the two important objectives in drawing the
boundaries - -promoting youth welfare and social welfare - - are straightforward and usually are
aligned in pointing toward a particular classification. In the next section, I turn to juvenile
justice policy, a legal setting in which regulation has been less successful, and in which, recently at
least, these goals have been treated as irreconcilable. Moreover, the standard strategies of binary
classification have not worked well in this setting, and the tendency to ignore the developmental
realities of adolescence has impeded the creation of effective policies for more than a century.
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III. JUVENILE CRIME AND THE DEFINITION OF CHILDHOOD
In the past 100 years, legal policy toward youth crime has undergone three periods of
reform. The first period began with the founding of the first Juvenile Court in Chicago in 1899.
The goal of the Progressive reformers was to create a separate court and correctional system for
juveniles that would focus solely on the welfare of young offenders, with a goal of rehabilitation
rather than punishment.84 In the 1960s, a new wave of reform grew out of disillusion over the
perceived failure of rehabilitation as the basis of juvenile justice policy. After the United States
Supreme Court announced that due process was required in delinquency proceedings,85
legislatures and law reformers introduced the principle of accountability and recognized public
protection as a goal of juvenile justice policy. At the same time, they sought to retain the unique
character of the juvenile justice system, with its focus on youth welfare.86 For approximately the
past decade, policy makers have responded to public fear of what is perceived to be a dramatic
increase in youth crime.87 The goal of this contemporary reform movement has been protect
society from young offenders, by subjecting juveniles who commit serious crimes to the same
standard of punishment as their adult counterparts.
Embedded in the reform rhetoric of different periods are strikingly different images of
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young offenders, and a distinctive story about their typical characteristics. These accounts, in turn,
have been employed to shape and justify juvenile justice policy. The Progressive reformers in the
early years of the juvenile court described young offenders as innocent vulnerable children, to be
molded into productive adults through rehabilitative interventions. The post-Gault reformers of
the 1970's and 1980's offered a more realistic view. Young offenders were less culpable than
adults because they lacked developmental experience and mature judgment, but they were not
blameless children. In contrast, the descriptions by the reformers of the 1990's suggest that
adolescent offenders are indistinguishable from adult criminals.
Situating these accounts of childhood into the earlier discussion, the Progressive reformers
adopted the conventional approach of treating delinquent youths as legal children and ascribing to
them the traits of innocence and vulnerability. The modern conservative reformers, on this view,
advocate shifting the boundary of childhood downward, and defining young offenders as adults.
As we have seen, these moves are not unusual among policy makers - - although the
contemporary advocates of more punitive policies display a singular lack of concern for youth
welfare, and would count youngsters as adults at an age when they are deemed children for
virtually every other legal purpose.88
For reasons that I will explore shortly, however, neither of these approaches works well as
a basis for policy toward adolescent offenders. The standard binary categories fail as public policy
in this context because they undermine society’s interest in public protection and accountability (a
flaw of the traditional court), or because they harm young offenders and diminish their prospects
for productive adulthood (the deficiencies of contemporary policies). Indeed, I will argue that,
although the Progressive reformers focused on youth welfare and modern conservatives
emphasize public protection, both models are seriously flawed even in terms of their self-defined
goals. Only policies that attend to adolescence as a distinctive developmental stage between
childhood and adulthood are likely to realize both of these objectives. Only the post- Gault
reformers understood this.
A. The Early Juvenile Court: Young Offenders as Innocent Children
The Progressive reformers at the turn of the century had an ambitious agenda for
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improving the lives of children and promoting their development into productive adults. Juvenile
justice reform was only one part of a far-reaching initiative which included compulsory school
attendance laws, restrictions on child labor and the creation of a child welfare system.89 In an era
in which mid-adolescents often assumed adult roles and burdens, an important objective of the
reform was to expand the boundaries of childhood, and to promote the idea that older youths, like
younger children, should enjoy the protection and solicitude of the state. Miriam Van Waters
described the underlying theory of the juvenile court in the following terms:
“[T]he child of the proper age to be under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court is encircled
by the arm of the state, which, as a sheltering, wise parent, assumes guardianship and has
power to shield the child from the rigors of the common law and from the neglect and
depravity of adults.” 90
Several strategies were employed to accomplish this goal. First, as the statement by Van
Waters suggests, reformers employed romantic rhetoric - - describing the youthful subjects of
reform policies in childlike terms, drawing upon a shared understanding of the innocence,
vulnerability, and dependency of childhood. Images of children working in factories under
horrendous conditions were evoked to generate support for child labor and school attendance
laws, under which youths remained in school until age sixteen in many jurisdictions.91 Reinforcing
this image of youthfulness was the metaphor of the state as the kind parent concerned only with
the welfare of children.
The challenge of reshaping the image of young criminals was particularly daunting. At the
dawn of the juvenile court movement, only children under the age of seven were insulated from
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criminal prosecution on grounds of infancy.92 A primary focus of the energies of the Progressive
reformers was the establishment of a separate court for the adjudication and correction of
offenders up to 16 or 18 years of age, a court that would also respond to the needs of children
who were subject to abuse and neglect by their parents. Central to the philosophy of the new
juvenile court (and to the political strategy of reformers) was the claim that delinquent youths and
children who were neglected by their parents were not very different from each other. All of the
children who came within the jurisdiction of the court were innocent victims of inadequate
parental care, and the state’s role in both delinquency and neglect cases was to intervene “in the
spirit of a wise parent toward an erring child.”93 Indeed, parental neglect was understood to be
the primary cause of delinquency.94 The political objective was to promote an image of young
offenders as children whose parents had failed them rather than as criminals who threatened the
community.
The reformers pursued this goal by emphasizing the similarity between young delinquents
and neglected children, and by advocating similar treatment. Judge Mack’s famous challenge is
representative: “Why is it not just and proper to treat these juvenile offenders, as we deal with the
neglected children, as a wise and merciful father handles his own child whose errors are not
discovered by the authorities?”95 Other juvenile court evangelists, such Judge Ben Lindsay,
offered heartwarming stories of wayward children who came before the court, and were set on the
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right path through the guidance of the fatherly judge (himself) and other court personnel.96 These
romanticized accounts of young delinquents included older youths as well as young boys and
girls, and serious crimes as well as minor misdeeds.97 All of the young miscreants were described
sympathetically as innocent children gone astray who needed only the firm (but kind) parenting
that the court could provide.
Although the Progressive reformers effectively expanded the boundaries of childhood
through child labor and school attendance reforms, their efforts in the juvenile justice context
were less successful. The romanticized descriptions of adolescent offenders as innocent children
played an important role in reinforcing the idealistic premise that no conflict of interest pitted the
state against the young offender, and that the purpose of state intervention in delinquency cases
(as in child welfare cases) was solely to promote the welfare of youngster before the court. This
was always a shaky premise, which ignored the fact that young offenders, unlike children whose
parents provide inadequate care, cause social harm through their criminal conduct. On reflection,
it seems clear that the failure to recognize adequately the state’s inherent interest in protecting
society in delinquency cases constituted a corrosive flaw at the heart of the rehabilitative model of
juvenile justice. Acceptance of rehabilitation likely was always predicated on its effectiveness in
reducing youth crime and protecting society.98 Moreover, the non-adversarial procedures,
indeterminate sentences and rejection of the criminal law principle of proportionality that were the
hallmarks of the traditional juvenile justice system were justified on parens patriae grounds;
ultimately, it became clear that they harmed the interests of young offenders.99 In short, the
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traditional model of juvenile justice failed to promote the welfare of the young charges of the
system, and it failed to serve the larger societal interest. As the 20th century progressed, the myth
of the rehabilitative ideal was discredited, together with the image of the adolescent offender as an
innocent child.
B. Young Offenders as Adults: Contemporary Justice Reform
In contrast to the Progressives, who described young offenders as innocent children,
conservative reformers today describe them as adults who should be held fully accountable for
their crimes. Responding initially to an increase in violent juvenile crime (particularly homicide),
reformers in the past decade have argued for policies under which juveniles (at least those who
commit serious crimes) are tried in adult courts and sentenced to adult prisons.100 The goals of
modern criminal justice reform are public protection and punishment, and in service of these
goals, reform rhetoric has obliterated any distinctions between youthful offenders and adults.101
As one early supporter of “get tough” policies argued, “there is no reason to be more lenient with
a 16 year old offender than a thirty year old offender.”102
These advocates for tougher juvenile crime policies reject virtually every aspect of the
Progressive image of young offenders as immature children. On their view, the romanticized
accounts of youngsters getting into scrapes with the law have no relevance in a world in which
savvy young offenders commit serious crimes. These reformers apparently assume that there are
no psychological differences between adolescent and adult offenders that are important to criminal
responsibility.103 Juvenile offenders are “criminals who happen to be young, not children who
THE BORDERLAND OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE (1964).
100
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happen to be criminal.”104 This stance is partly (perhaps largely) strategic. Images of childhood
are associated with legal protection and leniency; thus, policies that punish juveniles as adults are
politically more palatable if adolescent offenders are described as criminals, rather than as
children.
The modern reformers have pursued their agenda of shifting the boundary of childhood
downward through several legislative strategies. The age of judicial transfer has been lowered in
many states and a broader ranges of felonies can trigger a transfer hearing.105 In a transfer
hearing, an individualized determination is made of whether the young defendant should be
deemed a legal adult for purposes of criminal prosecution or adjudicated as a child in juvenile
court. In contrast to the standard applied under traditional juvenile court statutes, the inquiry that
determines this classification today is not made on the basis of amenability to treatment (which is,
in part, a maturity inquiry), but rather of the seriousness of the offense and criminal record.106
Under legislative waiver statutes, young offenders charged with designated serious crimes are
defined categorically as adults, and excluded from juvenile court jurisdiction based on age and
offense, without an inquiry into maturity.107 Under “direct file” statutes, prosecutors determine
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the classification; they can bring charges in either adult or juvenile court for a range of serious
offenses.108 Finally, blended sentencing statutes subject juveniles to stiff minimum sentences in
juvenile court, which are completed through transfer to prison when the offender becomes an
adult.109 The upshot is that the mantra of punitive reformers, “adult time for adult crime,” is a
reality for many juveniles. Through a variety of policy initiatives, the boundary of childhood has
shifted dramatically and many offenders who are not yet in high school are tried and sentenced as
adults.
Modern reformers advocate treatment of juvenile offenders as adults primarily in pursuit
of the utilitarian goal of public protection, and assume that strict policies will enhance social
welfare.110 In this regard, the justice reforms bear some similarity to other laws that shift the
boundary of childhood to define adolescents as adults. The medical consent statutes and Federal
restrictions on alcohol sales discussed previously also aim to reduce the social cost of harmful
behaviors by minors. An obvious difference, of course, is that contemporary juvenile justice
reformers make no serious claim that young offenders themselves will benefit. On this ground,
the initiative to shrink the category of legal childhood in the criminal justice context is unique, and
seemingly inconsistent with the values and policies that generally shape legal regulation of
children. Holding immature offenders to adult standards of criminal responsibility also challenges
important principles that define the boundaries of criminal punishment.111 Under these
circumstances, it is fair at a minimum to require substantial evidence that the reforms will produce
the promised social benefits. In fact, as I will argue shortly, even if the only goal of juvenile justice
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policy were to minimize the social cost of youth crime, responses that treat young offenders like
adult criminals are unlikely to achieve that goal. Both social welfare and youth welfare are
undermined by these policies.
C. The Post- Gault Reformers: Justice Policies in a Developmental Framework
In re Gault exposed the flawed foundations of the rehabilitative model of juvenile justice
and shattered the myth that delinquency interventions were aimed at promoting the welfare of
wayward but innocent children. As Justice Fortas pointed out, many juveniles got the worst of
both worlds. Because of the court’s ostensibly benign purposes, they were not accorded the
procedural protections that adult criminal defendants received. At the same time, many young
offenders were sent to correctional institutions for long sentences where they received little
rehabilitation.112
In the 1970s and 80s, several reform groups responded to the challenge of Gault by
proposing juvenile justice policies based on a realistic account of adolescence 113 These initiatives
rejected the image of young offenders as innocent children that was so central to the Progressive
account and to traditional policies.114 However, the post-Gault reformers were mindful of
criminal law principles limiting punishment, and motivated to devise a system that served the
interests of young offenders as well as that of society. Thus, they rejected the alternative of
classifying adolescents as fully responsible adults. Young offenders, under their account,
possessed sufficient capacity for understanding, reasoning, and moral judgment to be held
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accountable for their offenses (and indeed needed lessons in accountability115), but were
psychologically less mature and therefore less blameworthy than adult offenders.116 Moreover, as
Frank Zimring, the most prominent of the reformers, argued, if delinquent youths were given
“room to reform,” predictably many would mature out of their tendencies to get involved in
crime.117
The law reform groups struggled with the challenge of creating a modern juvenile justice
system that recognized that public safety and retribution were legitimate policy goals, but that also
acknowledged the differences between adult and juvenile offenders.118 Under this new justice
model, juvenile dispositions were to be based on the seriousness of the offense, rather than on the
needs of the offender. However, because juveniles were less blameworthy than their adult
counterparts, their dispositions were to be categorically of shorter duration.119 Furthermore,
separate dispositional programs for juveniles were justified, to prepare them for adult roles and to
insulate them from association with adult criminals.120 In short, the post-Gault reformers adopted
a model of juvenile justice policy that was grounded in the realities of adolescent development and
rejected conventional binary classification of young offenders as either children or adults.
These reform efforts influenced legislative change. Many states enacted statutes that
explicitly rejected the traditional notion that rehabilitation is the only purpose of juvenile justice
intervention, and recognized the importance of retribution and public protection.121 Modern
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statutory sentencing provisions focus on the seriousness of the offense and the prior record of the
offender as key considerations. Nevertheless, until recently, most statutory reforms also
embodied the core premise of the post-Gault initiatives--that because of their developmental
immaturity, most juveniles should be subject to a juvenile court proceeding (though one that was
characterized by procedural formality and due process protections), and to more lenient
punishment than adults in separate correctional facilities.
Despite the recent trend toward classifying young offenders as adults, the lessons of the
post-Gault developmental model have persisted. Some states have undertaken legislative reforms
accommodating the interests of the young offender and of society. For example, Pennsylvania’s
Juvenile Act adopts a “balanced approach,” embracing three goals: community protection,
accountability and “competency development,” (to enable young offenders to become productive
community members when they return to society).122 Moreover, some courts insist on
considering the immaturity of offenders in sentencing young criminals, despite statutory
encouragement to impose “adult time for adult crime.” Thus, a Michigan judge recently insisted
on sentencing a 13 year old boy convicted of committing homicide when he was 11 to a juvenile
facility, despite a statutory provision authorizing adult penalties.123 Finally, new reform groups
are at work, promoting juvenile justice policies that acknowledge the realities of adolescent
development.124 In the next section, I will argue that this model is likely to be a more effective
long term strategy to respond to juvenile crime than either the traditional approach or
contemporary policies.
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D. The Case for a Developmental Approach to Juvenile Justice Policy
Although the boundary of childhood is drawn in most legal contexts without reference to
the transitional developmental stage of adolescence, an approach that categorically defines
adolescents charged with crimes as either children or adults has costly consequences. Both the
Progressives who established the traditional juvenile court and modern punitive reformers are
committed to fictional accounts about the clientele of the juvenile justice system, because these
accounts are essential to their policy agendas. This stratagem, although it is standard among
policy makers, fails in this context, and policies based on the conventional binary categories fail
either to either promote youth welfare or to serve the public interest. These objectives will be
better served, I will argue, if policy makers recognize that young offenders are neither innocent
children or mature adults.
Despite its benign tone, the myth constructed by the architects of the traditional juvenile
court ultimately did more harm than good. Even assuming that the Progressive reformers had
pure intentions (an assumption that some have challenged125), the myth was probably never
persuasive when applied to older youths charged with serious crimes. It led many to conclude that
the juvenile justice system was insufficiently concerned about public safety and accountability.126
Moreover, those who cared about the interests of young offenders recognized that the fictional
premise of the traditional model obscured the extent to which punishment and public protection
were important but hidden forces that determined the disposition of young offenders. Because its
avowed goal was to promote the welfare of young delinquents, the juvenile court operated
without the procedural constraints that protect adult criminal defendants, whose interest was
always understood to be in conflict with that of the state. Further, again because the ostensible
purpose of intervention was to rehabilitate rather than punish the child, the court and correctional
system had virtually unbridled discretion in fashioning dispositions, unconstrained by the
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principles limiting criminal punishment.127 Thus, as Justice Fortas noted, juveniles, indeed,
sometimes got the worst of both worlds - - no procedural protections and little rehabilitation in
prison-like correctional facilities.128
In contrast, modern reformers who would “get tough” on juveniles make no pretense that
they aim to benefit young offenders, an objective that is made irrelevant by their assumption that
adolescents deserve the same punishment for their offenses as their adult counterparts. They also
assume (and argue) that shifting the boundaries of childhood is essential to protect society from
the ravages of juvenile crime. The empirical evidence from developmental psychology and
criminology challenges both of these assumptions. First, it supports the argument that holding
young offenders fully accountable for their crimes violates the principle of proportionality, which
defines fair criminal punishment. The constraints of proportionality are satisfied if juvenile
offenders are held to a standard of diminished criminal responsibility, because their decisions
about involvement in criminal activity reflect immaturity of understanding and judgment. Second,
the assumption that strict penal policies promote social welfare is challenged by evidence about
the role of antisocial behavior in adolescent development. This evidence suggests that many
adolescents are inclined to engage in criminal activity and desist with maturity. Thus, policy
makers who are focused on utilitarian goals must calculate not only the direct costs of the harm
caused by young offenders, but also the long term costs of criminal punishment.
1. Criminal Responsibility in Adolescence
The criminal law assumes that most offenders make rational autonomous choices to
commit crimes, and that the legitimacy of punishment is undermined if the decision is coerced,
irrational or based on a lack of understanding about the meaning of the choice.129 The principle of
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proportionality requires that punishment be proportionate to blameworthiness, which in turn is
mitigated if the individual’s decisionmaking capacity is deficient.130 Thus a defendant whose
decisionmaking is grossly distorted by mental illness may be fully excused from responsibility
under the insanity defense.
The relationship between immaturity and criminal responsibility has been obscured for
much of the 20th century by the adjudication and disposition of juveniles in a separate system that
lacked a vocabulary to analyze these issues. Historically (prior to the founding of the juvenile
court), the presumption that immaturity was relevant to assessing blame was captured in the
common law infancy defense.131 However, punishment, responsibility, and blameworthiness had
no place in the rehabilitative model of juvenile justice, and thus, the issue of how the criminal law
should take immaturity into account in assigning punishment got little attention for decades.
Recently, as policy makers seek to punish children as adults, this issue has become salient once
again. Yet, a doctrinal, analytic, and scientific vacuum of sorts exists, and there is much empirical
and conceptual work to be done to provide a sound basis for policy.
The psychological research evidence suggests that developmental factors characteristic of
adolescence contribute to immature judgment in ways that seem likely to affect criminal
choices.132 In general, youths are likely to have less knowledge and experience to draw on in
making decisions than adults. Moreover, peer conformity is a powerful influence on adolescent
behavior, and may lead teens to become involved in criminal activity to avoid social rejection.133
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It is not surprising that, in contrast to adult crime, most juvenile criminal activity takes place in
groups.134 Adolescents also seem to perceive risks differently or less well than adults, and they
are more inclined to engage in risky activities (smoking, drinking, unprotected sex and delinquent
behavior for example).135 Finally, time perspective changes with maturity. As compared to
adults, adolescents tend to focus more on immediate, rather than long term, consequences.136
It is not difficult to speculate about how these traits might contribute to youthful decisions
to get involved in criminal activity - - although it must be acknowledged that we have little direct
research evidence about decisionmaking “on the street.” A youth, considering the prospect of a
convenience store hold-up, might fail to perceive risks that adults would recognize. In part, this
may be due to a greater tendency to discount the future and to focus on short term consequences.
Peer approval, the excitement of the situation, and the possibility of getting some money may all
weigh more heavily in his decisionmaking than the possibility of apprehension or the long term
consequences for his future of a criminal conviction.
These developmental influences on adolescent decisionmaking--peer influence, risk
perception and preference, and time perspective --together contribute to immature judgment,
which distinguishes adolescent decisionmaking about involvement in crime from that of adults.137
This developmental immaturity constitutes evidence supporting the argument that adolescents are
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less blameworthy in their criminal choices than are adults. On the other hand, adolescents are not
innocent children. At least by mid-adolescence, the differences between adolescents and adults are
considerably more subtle than those that distinguish from the norm the defendant who is excused
from responsibility by reason of insanity.138 Thus, adolescent immaturity should not excuse young
offenders from criminal responsibility, but rather support a standard of diminished
responsibility.139 A diminished responsibility standard recognizes that most young offenders are in
a transitional developmental stage and calibrates criminal liability accordingly.140 Under such a
regime, young offenders can be held accountable for the bad choices they make, without bearing
the full costs of their mistakes.141
2. Adolescent Development and the Social Costs of Juvenile Crime
It is unlikely that many people who support punishing young offenders as adults will be
persuaded by arguments that juveniles should be subject to a standard of diminished responsibility.
The likely response is that the differences between adults and adolescents are modest and should
be ignored, because the top priority of justice policy must be to respond to the powerful threat to
social welfare posed by juvenile crime. In this section, I challenge the claim that punitive policies
are the optimal means to achieve public protection and to minimize the social cost of youth crime,
and suggest that utilitarian ends can better be served by policies that protect the future prospects
of young offenders.
The argument for discounting youth as a mitigating factor in applying criminal sanctions
has a superficial appeal. After all, youths who are in prison can not be on the street committing
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crimes. However, the utilitarian assumption ignores the long term costs of punitive policies, costs
that are likely to be substantial given the developmental patterns of antisocial behavior in
adolescence. Criminal behavior is rare in early adolescence; it increases through age 16, and
decreases sharply from age 17 onward.142 Most teen age males participate in some delinquent
behavior, a fact that has led Terrie Moffitt, a developmental criminologist, to conclude that
delinquent behavior is “a normal part of teen life.”143 However, most youthful criminal conduct is
what Moffitt has called “adolescence-limited” behavior. The typical adolescent offender
predictably will desist from criminal activity and mature into a productive (or at least not criminal)
citizen if he survives this stage without destroying his life chances.144 Contrary to the assumption
of advocates for tougher sanctions, only a small minority are “life course persistent” offenders (in
Moffitt’s parlance) - - youths who are at high risk for lives as career criminals.145 Whether and
when individuals in the first group will assume conventional adult roles is likely to depend in part
on the state’s response to their youthful criminal conduct. A policy of categorically imposing
adult criminal penalties on young offenders may increase the probability that they will become
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career criminals, or it may delay desistence.146 At a minimum, it seems a modest claim that
criminal punishment will undermine the future educational and employment prospects and general
social productivity of those offenders whose criminal conduct is adolescence-limited.
Developmental analysis suggests that the policy reformers who embrace utilitarian
objectives have failed to include in their calculus some important social costs of punitive policies.
Predictions about the effectiveness of these policies are based on one of two assumptions -perhaps on both. Either the reformers believe that most young offenders are incipient career
criminals (and thus the social benefits of adult punishment may outweigh the predicted costs to
their future life prospects)--or they believe that the future course of young offenders’ lives will be
not be affected negatively by adult criminal punishment. The psychological evidence indicates that
the first assumption is simply inaccurate; the second seems implausible.
What would be the features of a juvenile justice policy based on a realistic account of
adolescence? First, such a policy would incorporate principles of accountability through the
adoption of a diminished responsibility standard. This is important for several reasons. Public
acceptance and moral legitimacy are crucially important to the success of criminal justice policy.147
There is substantial evidence that American society cares about youthful accountability, and
would support policies based on diminished responsibility, as long as public protection were not
sacrificed.148 Moreover, lessons in accountability benefit young offenders; adolescents need to
learn from their foolish choices, so that they can assume adult roles and responsibilities
successfully. Second, a developmentally-based juvenile justice policy would seek to protect rather
than damage adolescents’ prospects for a productive future. Procedural protections that limit the
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longitudinal study that should provide important information on this issue.
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PAUL ROBINSON & JOHN DARLEY, JUSTICE, LIABILITY AND BLAME (1995) (describing empirical
studies supporting argument that the criminal law conforms, at least roughly, to societal attitudes, and that this is
important to its legitimacy.); Paul Robinson, The Utility of Desert, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 453 (1997) (same).
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See Robinson and Darley, id at 127. These researchers found that respondents in their study favored
more lenient punishment of immature minors, particularly if young offenders were civilly committed. This
suggests that a concern about public safety mediates attitudes about youthful culpability.
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stigma and lasting impact of delinquency status are worthwhile (for example, closed hearings and
sealed records).149 Dispositional programs that emphasize education and job skills can better
prepare young offenders for adult roles.
Finally, it seems important to maintain a separate system of adjudication and disposition
for juveniles, a system in which juveniles are accorded procedural protections, but are subject to
reduced penalties and offered programs that promote their healthy development. Some observers
have argued that a unified criminal justice system that provided a “youth-discount” in sentencing
would better serve the interests of both young offenders and society.150 Such an approach is
consistent with a diminished responsibility model, and would afford young defendants the full
range of procedural protections. My objections to this proposal are largely practical. I am
skeptical that the criminal justice system has either the ability or inclination to respond to
adolescents as a separate legal category. Political pressure appears to function as a one way
ratchet, toward ever stiffer penalties. A separate juvenile justice system is more likely to recognize
the reduced culpability of young offenders through more lenient sentencing, and to invest in
programs designed for adolescents.151
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See Kathleen M. Laubenstein, Comment, Media Access to Juvenile Proceedings, 68 TEMP. L. REV.
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Between Constitutional Priorities and Rehabilitation, 65 IOWA L. REV. 1471, 1484-1485 (1980).
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Barry Feld argues that the juvenile and criminal courts should be re-unified. BARRY FELD, BAD
KIDS, supra note 126. He bases his position on what he terms the “built-in contradiction” of the juvenile justice
system: while the court claims to offer treatment, its jurisdiction is not based on a need for treatment, but rather on
the offense committed, thus highlighting “the aspect of youths that rationally elicits the least sympathy and
[ignoring]...social conditions most likely to evoke a desire to help.” Id. at 295. His plan for unification includes
full procedural protections for young offenders, and differential sentencing tied to the age of the offender. Id. at
297. For example, a 14-year-old offender would receive 25% of the adult sentence, and a 16-year-old would
receive 50% of the adult sentence: the larger discount for the younger offender corresponding to the
“developmental continuum” of responsibility. Id. at 317. This sentencing policy would be standardized and not
discretionary, Id. at 304, and would be based on the idea that “youthfulness constitutes a universal form of ‘reduced
responsibility’ or ‘diminished capacity.’” Id. at 317.
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A separate juvenile court is also a better forum for accommodating the more limited trial competence
of young defendants, without sacrificing procedural protections. The Supreme Court in In re Gault extended many
procedural protections to juveniles, requiring the state to prove the guilt of juvenile defendants through fair
procedures. These protections benefit juveniles, but younger adolescents may be more limited in their capacity to
make decisions in the process or to assist their attorney. See Elizabeth Scott & Thomas Grace, supra note
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Adolescence in the Definition of Childhood
It could be said that adolescence and the juvenile court are of about the same age. Only at the
beginning of the 20th century, with the publication of G. Stanley Hall’s Adolescence, was this
transitional developmental stage between childhood and adulthood identified and described.152
Over the course of the twentieth century, legal policy makers have tended to ignore adolescence,
and to classify and describe adolescents categorically as either children or as adults, depending on
the issue at hand. Through the creation of a series of bright line rules, however, the process of
becoming a legal adult is extended through adolescence and into early adulthood, without
establishing an intermediate category for this group. This approach generally has functioned
effectively to promote both youth welfare and social welfare.
It has not worked well in juvenile justice policy. The experience of the 20th century
reveals that justice policies that treat young offenders either as children or as adults undermine
both social welfare and youth welfare. Both Progressive and conservative juvenile justice models
are flawed because they fail to attend to the unique importance in this context of recognizing and
reconciling the conflicting interests of young offenders and society, without sacrificing either.
The Progressives failed to see the conflict, while modern conservatives fail to see the need for
reconciliation. A policy based on the developmental reality of adolescence offers the promise of
meeting this challenge successfully.
The 21st century may see policy makers paying attention to the transitional stage of
adolescence in other domains. Our experience with abortion regulation tells us that this move can
be costly, and should be undertaken only when only when binary categories are inadequate. In
some contexts, living as an adult in society presents complex challenges, and adolescents (and
society) might benefit from a probationary period in which adult skills can be acquired, with
protection against the costs of inexperienced choices.153 For example, recent innovations in the
regulation of adolescent driving privileges allow young persons to gain experience while limiting
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See JOSEPH KETT, supra note 89 at 217-22. Hall saw adolescence as “torn by dualisms which disrupted
the harmony of childhood: hyperactivity and inertia, social sensibility and self-absorption, lofty intuitions and
childish folly.” Id. at 217.
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In the early 1980's, Frank Zimring adopted the metaphor of the “learners’ permit,” describing
adolescence as a period in which young persons learn lessons in freedom and responsibility, in preparation for
adulthood, without bearing the full cost of their mistakes. See FRANKLIN ZIMRING, CHANGING LEGAL WORLD,
supra note 5 at 89-98. The developmental model of juvenile justice policy fits this model.
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risk.154 On issues as varied as liability on contracts and preferences in custody disputes, courts
and legislatures in the late 20th century have recognized, implicitly at least, that adolescents are
persons who are not yet adults but are different from young children.155
Adolescence itself has become increasingly complex in the modern era. Young persons are
more sophisticated and have more freedom than ever before; at the same time, dependency
extends further into adulthood. Legal regulation of this category of citizens will never be simple,
although the themes that underlie much existing policy are likely to continue to dominate. As a
general matter, the long term interests of adolescents converge with the interests of society.
Policies that recognize this convergence are likely to be effective.
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A modern variation of the infancy defense adopted by some courts allows minors to disaffirm
contracts, but holds them accountable for damage, unless the other party engaged in overreaching. See Dodson v.
Shrader, supra note 16. Adolescents’ preferences are given substantial weight in custody disputes, unless their
choice of custodian is clearly against their interest. See note 26 supra.
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